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Innovation and the Interrelatedness of Core
Competencies: How Taiwan’s Giant Bicycles
broke into the us Bicycle Market
S. Phineas Upham
I argue that capabilities and barriers to entry are, in certain circum-
stances, interconnected in such a way that sacrificing one of them can
lead to the subsequent vulnerability or erosion of another capability or
barrier to entry. I illustrate this through a study of the us bicycle market
in the 1980’s in general, and Schwinn Corporation and Giant Manufac-
turing in particular, arguing that both the barriers to entry and the firm
capabilities were interrelated. A specific set of decisions by Schwinn had
broad and unanticipated eﬀects that went beyond the capacity they ex-
plicitly relinquished. In this case manufacturing and distribution were
tightly linked in such a way that without some form of tight link be-
tween them successful incremental innovation became diﬃcult. Seem-
ingly unrelated capabilities and strengths become mutually reinforcing
or interconnected. Instead of being able to choose to add a single ca-
pability, or choose to discard one, companies may instead be choosing
between sets, groups of interlinked, or patterned capabilities. A seem-
ingly small change may require a major reorganization of other core
capabilities that its ostensible status belies.
Key Words: international strategy, outsourcing, capabilities,
barriers to entry
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Introduction
On a sunny day in 1972 in Tachia, a port city in western Taiwan, a new
bicycle company called Giant Manufacturing oﬃcially opened its doors.
Back then, the vast majority of the world bicycle market was dominated
by established brands such as Schwinn Corporation, Derby Cycle, and
Huﬀy Corporation. A handful of domestic us brands controlled 76% of
the us market. These firms had an enviably entrenched industry posi-
tion in the us. From the industry perspective, bicycles were a hard mar-
ket to break into indeed: the level of technological expertise was high,
S. Phineas Upham is a doctoral candidate at the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, and a visiting scholar at New York
University, usa.
Managing Global Transitions 4 (1): 41–62
42 S. Phineas Upham
the name brand crucial, the distribution painstakingly complex, and,
perhaps most importantly, the distribution networks of specialty shops
were relationship-based and complex (Porter 1980; Porter 1996). When
these hurdles are combined with the high eﬃciencies of scale intrinsic
to bicycle production, the barriers to entry in that industry were indeed
substantial and Giant’s obstacles were great.
Given this, the rise of the bicycle maker Giant Manufacturing has been
surprising. By 1980, Taiwan was the largest exporter of bicycles in the
world and today with over $ 400 million in total sales; Giant Manufac-
turing is one of the largest bicycle producers in the world. Indeed, in
2001, Giant was named one of Fortune Magazine’s ‘20 best small compa-
nies in the world’ (http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune). Perhaps
almost as surprising as Giant’s rise is the fall of the old guard of bicycle
producers. Derby Cycle had gone into bankruptcy and was largely bro-
ken up, Schwinn had been sold out of bankruptcy to Pacific Cycle for
a mere $ 86 million and then acquired by Dorel Industries in 2004, and
Huﬀy went into bankruptcy in 2004 for restructuring, emerging in 2005.
All this was during a period of 30 years of healthy growth in the bicycle
industry as a whole.
What happened? The answer to this puzzle lies in an examination of
the bicycle industry and a close study of the actions of bicycle produc-
ers in the 1980s – actions which, in combination with market changes,
ultimately led to the erosion of the bundle of capabilities which were re-
sponsible for their initial dominance. We will frame this more theoretical
discussion in a reified examination of how these firms allowed an upstart
in Taiwan to gain the capabilities to topple them and take an industry
leadership role (Porter 1990).
While discussions of core competence and capabilities can be traced
back to Porter in the 1980s, it is only recently that the idea has emerged
that capabilities may be interrelated (Baldwin and Clark 2001; Levinthal
1997; Porter 1980; 1985; Porter 1996; Shane 2001b). In this case we be-
lieve manufacturing and distribution in high- and middle-end bicycle
production became tightly linked due to industry changes in the 1970s
and 1980s (Shane 2001a). Bike shops were increasingly demanding a fast
turnover and a constant innovation in the product line; they wanted fast-
paced and incremental improvements to move expensive bike invento-
ries. The tight link between manufacturing and distribution encouraged
incremental innovation and an understanding of industry trends. Bikes
became items of prestige and fashion with an emphasis on excellence
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of craftsmanship rather than utility. A slow new product introduction,
occasional radical innovations, and a less than perfect control over pro-
duction were not suﬃcient for this market. In this shifting context, and
despite a healthy overall demand, the actions of us bike makers in the
1980s caused them to under perform.
We will examine the barriers to entry of the bicycle industry, the re-
sources at Giant’s disposal, and the exogenous changes in the industry
that may have made a diﬀerence. This is not a case study that indiscrim-
inately criticizes outsourcing or unambiguously praises the advantages
of cheap labor and eﬃcient production methods. Instead, it is a tale of
the interconnectivity of core capabilities, complementary competencies,
and interlocking barriers to entry that, once breached, began to gush.
It is a case study that, we hope, will do more service by attempting to
complicate existing paradigms rather than challenge them.
And now the ‘child is father to the man’ (Wordsworth, ‘My heart leaps
up when I behold’). In a situation that is in many ways reminiscent of
that of the 1970s, Taiwan began to manufacture in China. King Liu, Gi-
ant’s founder and chairman, has recognized that production in China,
where wages are low and the potential for sales is high, would be more
eﬃcient. But is he aware that he has helped teach us bicycle producers
to struggle over the last 30 years? He claims he is consciously shifting
production into China through a very diﬀerent model than us firms did
into Taiwan 50 years ago.What lesson has this modern day David learned
now that he has grown to be the Giant himself? But first let us explore the
two major players in this story: Schwinn Corporation and Giant Manu-
facturing.
Schwinn – Company History
Schwinn/gt Corporation, bankrupt and sold to Pacific Cycle and later to
Dorel Industries, was founded in 1885 by the German immigrant Ignaz
Schwinn and Chicago investor Adolph Arnold. At the time it was called
Arnold, Schwinn & Company, but Arnold sold his portion of the com-
pany back to the Schwinn family in 1908. Schwinn sold quality bikes, at
first in retail locations such as Sears, Roebuck and Co., which accounted
for 75% of Schwinn sales by 1917. Ignaz’s son invented the air filled bal-
loon tire for bikes before World War ii, receiving only laughs from his
competitors until the tire became a financial success in the children’s
bike market during the Great Depression. By 1950, Schwinn was making
25% of the bicycles sold in the us. Schwinn came out with another tech-
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nological breakthrough in the 1960s when it introduced a gear-shifting
derailleur, which allowed the bicycle to more easily navigate hills.
Schwinn began to miss market trends as the European style of faster,
lighter bikes became popular in the 1970s and 1980s, and as the mountain
bike craze of the 1980s and 1990s grew. In 1981, the workers of Schwinn
Corporation’s largest factory in Chicago went on strike. Workers were
demanding to be paid the same rate as auto workers. Schwinn closed its
three Chicago factories and moved production overseas.
In 1992, Schwinn filed for bankruptcy. It was revitalized for a time
under the new owner Zell/Chilmark who bought the company for $ 43
million and proceeded to make a number of expensive acquisitions of
smaller, elite bike producers. By 1996, Schwinn again climbed the ranks
in terms of volume and became the No. 2 us bicycle maker. In addition,
it launched a very successful line of spinning machines (stationary bicy-
cles) for health clubs. In 1998, Schwinn bought bike maker gt Bicycles
for $ 170 million, thus gaining control of high-tech manufacturing facil-
ities for the first time since the 1980s, something which had been lacking
for decades. Perhaps it was too little too late, in 2001, Schwinn/gt again
filed for bankruptcy. It was sold for $ 86 million to the bicycle importer
Pacific Cycle which planned to bring the Schwinn brand downmarket by,
for the first time, selling an inexpensive version of its products in large-
retail outfits such as Wal-Mart. In 2004, Pacific Cycle was purchased by
the conglomerate Dorel Industries.
Giant – Company History
Giant Manufacturing began in 1972 as a low-end manufacturer and ex-
porter of bicycles. It received its first large break in 1981 when the largest
us bike maker, Schwinn, hired it to produce bicycles. Giant provided en-
gineering, technology, and volume sales, and Schwinn received bicycles
that were less expensive than those produced in the us, and sold them
under its own name in the us. By 1984, Giant was producing 700,000
bicycles a year for Schwinn.
When in 1985 Schwinn and Giant ended their partnership, it was only
a partial break, since Schwinn continued to outsource to Giant, though
not to as great an extent as before, but it was nevertheless a significant
break. This acted as a catalyst for Giant, who was at this point outsourc-
ing for many us bicycle producers, and was therefore spurred to create
its own brand. Giant began selling its own brand of bicycles first in Eu-
rope and then, in 1987, in the us. It routinely oﬀered bike distributors
Managing Global Transitions
Innovation and the Interrelatedness of Core Competencies 45
a 15% discount on bikes identical to those sold by Schwinn without the
name brand and could aﬀord to gradually build volume since it had its
supporting production for the us companies.
Back in the 1970s Giant did something very surprising (the significance
of which will be addressed later). It reversed the trend of outsourcing to
markets where labor was cheap, and built a factory in the Netherlands.
It chose this location, we believe, because the Netherlands is considered
a trendsetter in European design and because of the excellent Rotterdam
port and a large nearby airport. Indeed, the Netherlands is also one of the
largest recipients of us foreign direct investment. This factory was meant
to pick up on ideas and trends in the European racing bike tradition. One
of the interesting aspects of Giant product line was that only 75%of it was
standard, the remaining 25% was designed by regional managers to have
local appeal. Giant has designers in the us, Europe and Asia and, twice a
year, gathers them all together at its factories in Taiwan to work out ways
to lighten the frame, increase strength, etc.
Giant has recently begun establishing factories in China. In 1996, for
example, it produced 2.02million bicycles, of which 1.5million were pro-
duced in Taiwan, 550,000 in China, and 300,000 in the Netherlands. Cur-
rently they are the biggest bike sellers in China, accounting for 3% of all
bike sales in this growing market. The Olympics taking place in China in
2008 are likely to strengthen that market.
Historical Overview of the Bike Market 1970–1989
From the 1950s through the early 1980s, Schwinn was one of the largest
bicycle makers in the us and one among an exclusive club of bicyclemak-
ers in the us who had a virtual lock on the upper- and middle-level bicy-
cle market. Other major us bicycle manufacturers at the time included
Derby Cycle and Huﬀy. For these three companies, 1981 marked an im-
portant turning point – within a few years each of them would outsource
either all or most of their basic manufacturing to Asia without maintain-
ing much control over production.
Diﬃcult labor relations in the us, combined with high domestic wages
were causing a flood of companies to outsource to Asia (as well as, to a
more limited extent, South America). Taiwanese companies were already
exporting a large number of low- quality $ 40–50 bicycles into the us.
But the high- and middle-quality bike market was not like some other
us goods, such as vcr’s and tv’s, which were judged largely on sim-
ple price/quality ratios and ‘gee-wiz’ features. High-quality bike making
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was more and more becoming an art which required a close connection
to enthusiasts, an insight into trends, and craftsmanship. The high-end
($ 1,000–4,000) bike market was growing at double-digit rates.
In 2000, for example, 60% of bikes were sold thorough mass mer-
chant channels such as Toy’s-R-Us, Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target, and Sears.
The average price of these bikes was $ 75. Meanwhile, there were about
6,300 specialty shops selling middle- and high-quality bikes, accounting
for about 31% of the market. The price for these bikes started at around
$ 200 with the average at around $ 360. The rest of the market (9%) was
represented by sporting goods stores which typically sell middle price
bikes for something between the mass retailers and specialty shops. Fur-
thermore, specialty shops dominated the parts, accessories, and repair
market. Bike companies that sell to mass merchants and the ones that sell
to specialty shops were highly delineated. Huﬀy began as a high quality
maker of bikes and has since become a mass merchant supplier. Others,
such as Schwinn, Trek, Giant, and Derby typically sell at specialty shops.
Before the 1970s, the majority of the us bike market had been one of
style and fun. Bikes had sci-fi names like the phantom (1950s), and the
banana seated Sting Ray (1960s). In the us, two factors changed this:
technology and oil. In the 1970s, opec induced oil shocks that led to a
dramatic increase in the use of bikes for transportation, and ingrained
the bike in the imagination of the mainstream population. Bike lanes
were placed on the streets of many us cities in order to help accom-
modate their use. In Europe, with its more condensed cities and higher
gas taxes, bicycles had long enjoyed this sort of utilitarian use. Secondly,
derailleurs, or gear-shifts, were first mass manufactured by Schwinn in
the 1960s, and by the 1970s they were standard. These derailleurs allowed
bikes to climb hills much more easily, giving the bike an extended range
of terrain and usefulness. These changes were important to the future
of the bicycle. Still, the predominant use for the bike continued to be
for recreational and fitness reasons. Recent figures from the Interbike
Directory (www.interbike.com) show that 94.5% of bike riders ride for
recreation or fitness, while 5.2% do so for transportation, and 0.03% for
racing.
By the 1980s, bikes had enormous enthusiast support. Specialty bike
shops, the prime retailers of high quality bikes, were demanding bet-
ter and lighter bikes along the European tradition. Numbers hint at this
change but do not tell the whole story, in the us, for example, 8.9 mil-
lion adult bikes (with 20" and up wheels) were sold in 1981, 11.4 million
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in 1985, 12.6 million in 1986, and 10.7 million in 1989 (a slight drop). But
these modest increases do not show the quality of bikes sold. The aver-
age price to manufacture a bike in 1985 was around $ 40, but this num-
ber shot up to around $ 80 in 1989, a change not explained by inflation.
Bike manufacturers were rushing upstream to develop sophisticated bike
technologies only dreamed of a decade before (primarily in materials of
production, lightness of the frame, and detailing of the bike in manu-
facturing). In the 1980s bikes would attain a sort of status symbol, with
low-use buyers paying top prices for whatever enthusiasts determined
were top-of-the-line bikes. A few ounces less weight in the frame, a bit
more stability, a slightly better torque in the gears, these were significant
diﬀerentiators. As one would expect, this change in preference led to a
related change in the bicycles production cycle.
Whereas in the 1960s it was common for a company to put out a few
new bikes a year, by the late 1980s competitive companies were releas-
ing a few new models every few months. These changes dramatically af-
fected the bike industry where the core capabilities of the bike produc-
ers lay. Previously, large technological leaps, distribution networks and
name brand had been paramount in the bicycle market, but later, tech-
nology, fast production, and small and constant technological improve-
ment became just as important. And these capabilities were, arguably,
exactly those that the bike companies shipped, along with their trade se-
crets, their machines and their best engineers to Taiwan in the 1970s.
The Strategy Problems in Outsourcing in the Bicycle Industry
We will attempt to explain this concurrent rise and fall by synthesizing
three areas of the strategic literature: that of competencies, that of r&d,
and that of barriers to entry. This synthesis is meant to illuminate the im-
portance of thinking about core capabilities in a multi-dimensional way,
especially as related to risks of outsourcing. Management scholars often
view a firm’s competitive advantage as centering around core competen-
cies (Burgelman 1996; Pennings et al. 1994; Prahalad and Hamel 1990;
Siggelkow 2002). In the short run, price and performance measures de-
termine who is the winner or loser, but in the long run being competitive
along these two metrics is only a necessary and insuﬃcient precondition
to success. Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 81), for example, argue that ‘in the
long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost
and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn
unanticipated products. The real sources of competitive advantage are
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to be found in management’s ability to consolidate corporate wide tech-
nologies and production skills into competencies that empower individ-
ual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities’.
The Tight Fit between Production and Distribution
But as we shall see, by outsourcing production completely, Schwinn and
others compromised a core competence in their market with unexpected
results. Of all bikes now sold in the us, 93% are produced abroad and
imported, and virtually all of these are outsourced. The bicycle market
in the 1980s increasingly began to have closer and closer links between
production and distribution. Production cycles shortened and constant
small improvements in design became necessary in order to be competi-
tive. These improvements were, it turned out, just the sort of incremental
improvements that are discovered while making a product on the fac-
tory floor – a slightly lighter frame, a cap over the joints, a slightly bet-
ter gear/wheel alignment (Henderson and Mitchell 1997; Henderson and
Clark 1990). They are the sort of improvements one hears about from
hobbyists and then must try to execute through a deep understanding
of what it takes to make the bicycle. Driven by detail-oriented bicycle
hobbyists, the middle- and high-end bike market was not the one which
would coast on name or distribution networks. This set the stage for the
potential entrance of competitors into the bicycle market.
The ceo of Giant, Anthony Lo, says he believes bicycles are more than
machines. ‘Bicycles are as much a fashion item as a piece of machinery.
We sell bikes in several thousand variations. In the early 1990s we in-
troduced up to three new products per year, today, however, that figure
has grown to between five and ten, reflecting increasing sophistication
in the demand for bicycles’. Furthermore, each of these models usually
implemented a small improvement which made the bike more compet-
itive and helped stores move the inventory by touting the latest innova-
tion/improvement.
Schwinn and other bike manufacturers, driven to cut costs, out-
sourced broadly. In 1988, for example, when Giant first introduced its
own bike with its own label on it, Schwinn, despite having broken
its partnership with Giant in 1985, still manufactured 80% of its bikes
through Giant. At that time, Giant was also producing practically all the
bikes for Treks, Fisher, and Specialized, as well as other us bike sellers. As
Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 84) point out, ‘the embedded skills that gave
rise to the next generation of competitive products cannot be ‘rented in’
Managing Global Transitions
Innovation and the Interrelatedness of Core Competencies 49
by outsourcing and oem supply relationships’. After all, while outsourc-
ing can provide cheaper supply and delegate much of the headache of
production to another company, it does not build up the skill base that is
needed to maintain one’s engineers at the cutting edge, nor does it pro-
vide the company with the sort of know-how that comes on the factory
floor (Henderson and Clark 1990).
If there is one example that most clearly shows that production and
distribution are tightly linked, it is a look at the Giant’s factory in the
Netherlands. It is strange indeed that Giant, which, at least initially, de-
pended on cheaper labor costs to make cheaper bikes, would open a fac-
tory where labor costs were 70% higher than at home. At exactly the
same time as us bikemanufacturers were outsourcing most or all of their
bikes, Giant was investing heavily in building a new state-of-the art fac-
tory in Europe. What was its logic? Lo, the current ceo argues that this
factory was critical in promoting and speeding up innovation. With the
European racing bike market becoming more and more influential, Lo
believes that keeping production next to the customer is crucial both to
keep up with fashion and also to have faster and more responsive inno-
vations. Giant’s ability to produce, and its emphasis on producing spe-
cialized bikes for regional managers based on local demand necessitated
such a close connection with production. The diﬀerential success created
through this experimentation ultimately generated many new ideas for
new products and kept Giant abreast of changing needs and fashions.
The tight fit between production and manufacturing in the bicycle mar-
ket was a key interrelation for innovation and competitiveness. While
Schwinnmight have seen this outsourcing as merely cutting a cost center,
in fact the consequences of this decision were broad. Due to the demand
for fast customer responsiveness, the detail-oriented nature of bike en-
thusiasts, and the highly incremental nature of progress in bikes in the
1980s and 1990s, bike manufacturing of today is tightly tied to technical
competence, innovation, and customer satisfaction. In other industries,
where the dynamics of demand and the interconnections between capa-
bilities are diﬀerently strung, this relationship changes.
Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 84) stated it well by saying ‘there are two
clear lessons here. First, the costs of losing a core competence can be
only partly calculated in advance. The baby may be thrown out with the
bathwater in divestment decisions. Second, since core competencies are
built through a process of continuous improvement and enhancement
that may span a decade or longer, a company that has failed to invest in
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core competence building will find it very diﬃcult to enter an emerging
market, unless, of course, it will be content simply to serve as a distribu-
tion channel’. And this is exactly what Schwinn and others have become.
When Schwinn attempted to build a factory in Greenville, Mississippi a
few years after outsourcing to Giant, it failed to produce bikes of suf-
ficient quality. Similarly, when Schwinn later tried to buy a factory in
Hungary and produce bikes cheaply there, it failed to produce bikes suit-
able for import (Brown and Duguid 1991; 2001). Schwinn had lost the
capability to produce high-end bikes. It never regained that capability
until 1998 when it bought gt Bicycles for $ 180 million; gt did indeed
have excellent manufacturing capabilities.
The Tight Link between Understanding Customer’s
Needs and Production
This leads to a related part of the literature which delves more deeply into
the specific costs of outsourcing to essential knowledge bases (Barney
1999; Poppo and Zenger 1998). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that
r&d spending can add to a company’s essential abilities to understand
and advance in the field. In the case of middle- and high-end bicycle
production, r&d comes in two components: periodic and punctuated
(Levinthal 1998; Romanelli and Tushman 1994; Siggelkow 2001; Tushman
and Anderson 1986). Despite periodic huge leaps in the bicycle market,
such as inflatable tires in the 1930s, gear shifts in the 1960s, both pio-
neered by Schwinn, there are also the small, steady and very production-
based advances. These advances are focused on small increases in per-
formance in highly competitive situations. The European market, infat-
uated with grueling and highly competitive bike races, set the trends in
the 1980s. Enormous importance was put on small incremental changes
in order to gain a slight edge in such races. A passage from a bike afi-
cionado’s web page called Bike Magic (www.bikemagic.com), detailing
the production in a Giant factory, serves as an example:
Start by taking a look at Giant’s frames. Giant Chromoly bikes
are fully butted with all butting done in the factory. Not only
do many of Giant’s competitors not butt their own tubing, but
they will cut corners by not butting a top tube, down tube, seat
tubes or seat stay like Giant does every time. Giant ovalizes its
frame tubing at the factory. Again, very few companies do this.
Ovalized tubing provides a larger weld area which serves to
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strengthen the frame. Ovalization also reduces the weight by
controlling wall thickness where it’s needed the most.
All Giant atb’s and cross bikes have mono stay seat stays.
The result is better rear braking power and control due to re-
duced flexing. Giant’s aluminum frames are custom welded by
hand, just like the expensive custom frame makers. Giant has
never had a reported aluminum frame failure. Giant uses all
heat treated 6000 series aluminum. Heat treating is one ex-
tra step that Giant takes to ensure frame strength and reliabil-
ity . . . Giant produces everything under one roof – from draw-
ing, butting, and swagging to welding, heat treating, painting,
decaling, assembly and final shipping. All other bicycle manu-
facturers source out one or many of these production phases.
Not Giant. Giant stands alone.
One can see that r&d improvements in the bicycle industry would
necessarily have a lot to do with the details, care and quality of pro-
duction rather than only with large technological leaps (Levinthal 1998).
Thus, investments into this sort of capability will serve much the same
sort of knowledge-based ability to understand and respond to the com-
plaints and concerns of one’s customers (Siggelkow 2002). It is not easy
for a company that does not produce its own tubing to absorb and
address information concerning larger weld areas that increase frame
strength or weld problems on aluminum frames. To turn customer infor-
mation into innovation, a manufacturing technical capacity is needed.
This allows a firm to turn information from distributors and enthusi-
asts into real improvements on the factory floor. Cohen and Levinthal
(1990, 150) point out that ‘absorptive capacity is more likely to be de-
veloped and maintained as a byproduct of routine activities when the
knowledge domain that the firm wishes to exploit is closely related to its
current knowledge base’. After all, they point out (1990, 140), ‘the ease
of learning is in turn determined by the characteristics of the underlying
scientific and technological knowledge’.
Therefore, we see that cost considerations that drove Schwinn and
other bike manufacturers might have led to problems both in coming up
with new products, innovating, and in understanding customers desires
and complaints. In an industry as demanding and with as much obses-
sion for detail as the middle- and upper-end bike industry, these factors
were crucial in eroding the strength and capabilities of the entrenched
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us industries. But while this analysis might go toward explaining some
of the reasons for the weakness of Schwinn and other us firms, and it
points to where some of their mistakes might have been, it does not yet
give an accurate picture of the whole story.
Bicycle Market Barriers to Entry: The Interconnected
Nature of Barriers to Entry in the Bike Market
It is sometimes known as the problem of the commons. Some resources
are precious for a group of people but very hard to guard from the
exploitation of any one member. As a whole, and even individually, it
would be very well if no one ever exploited this resource. But given that
at any time one member can exploit it, and that this decision would put
cooperating members at a disadvantage, it is rational for all members to
exploit. Above we have described the weakening of core competencies of
the us bicycle firms and the undermining of their capacity for knowl-
edgeable relationships with their customers. But there remain significant
barriers to entry that the us firms enjoyed in themiddle- and upper-level
bike market in the 1980s:
1. Distribution networks:While less expensive bikes were sold through
large retail stores such as K-Mart and Wal-Mart, middle- and
upper-echelon bikes were sold predominantly through specialized
retailers. The us bike firms had hard-to-crack relationships with
these smaller retailers. It would take years for a new entrant to crack
enough of these stores to gain large numbers of bike sales.
2. The middle and upper quality bicycle market enjoyed enormous ef-
ficiencies of scale to be economical. To run a full bike factory, which
can produce hundreds of thousands of bikes each year, requires
enormous overhead as exemplified by Porter (1985). The combina-
tion of 1) a complex distribution system with 2) the need for large
scale production in order to sell at a competitive price makes the
market extremely diﬃcult to crack. The paradox is apparent: you
need to sell enough to be able to lower costs enough to sell. But
with a distribution network that takes a decade to crack, a decade
of steep losses is needed, during which the producer subsidizes cost
in order to build volume and market share.
3. In the middle- and upper-end bicycle market there was an addi-
tional hurdle. The technical ability tomake good bikes was orders of
magnitude more diﬃcult than the challenge of making cheap bikes
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(amarket in which Asian firms had long ago becomemajor players).
It required an intimate connection with enthusiasts, practiced engi-
neers, and long ingrained know-how. Numerous essays on organi-
zational learning emphasize how complex tasks become engrained
into the workers who do them and cannot be easily transferred or
re-learned (Brown and Duguid 2001; Cohen and Bacdayan 1994).
Porter (1975) outlines the potential barriers to entry in an industry just
after he notes that ‘[the five forces] reflect the fact that competition in an
industry goes well beyond the established players. Customers, suppliers,
and potential entrants are all “competitors to firms”’. He lists these bar-
riers as:
• economies of scale,
• product diﬀerentiation,
• capital requirements,
• access to distribution channels,
• cost disadvantages independent of scale (such as proprietary tech-
nology).
As argued above, from an industry perspective the us quality bike
market had a strong position in at least four, perhaps five of these five
areas (the possible exception being capital requirements since a bike fac-
tory can be inexpensive if it is designed to make only a small number of
bikes).
The problem arose from a prisoner’s dilemma (Cable and Shane 1997;
Kogut and Zander 1996; Radner 1992). In an oligopoly, a company can
pursue its own self-interest by undercutting its competitors, knowing
that this will start a war, or it can pursue the interests of the group and
forgo the short-term benefits of defection. By ‘cooperating’ or acting in
the interests of the group, the firmmay maximize its long-term interests.
As Porter (1980, 88) says ‘the dilemma arises because choosing strategies
or responses that avoid the risk of warfare and make the industry as a
whole better oﬀ . . . may mean that the firm gives up potential profits
and market share’.
Schwinn was the first of the major bike producers to move signifi-
cant portions of its middle- and upper-end bikes abroad through out-
sourcing. It had very strong competitive reasons for doing this, even if its
Chicago factory strike had not exacerbated the problem. In 1996, wages
in Taiwan, in the relevant norm, were below average: 5.41 $/hour vs.
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13.22 $/hour in the us. Production of this sort, furthermore, was some-
thing at which Taiwanese firms had proven very adept. Schwinn had ev-
ery expectation that their bikes from Taiwan would be less expensive and
better.
But to produce bikes in Taiwan, Schwinn had first to teach the Tai-
wanese how to produce such high quality bikes. Therefore, in 1981, it
shipped its best engineers and its most sophisticated machinery to Tai-
wan and began training the workers at Giant plants in the art of making
fine bicycles (which involved the use of both machine and hand labor).
The organizational routines were actually handed over to Giant volun-
tarily (Nelson and Winter 1982). This decision undermined the barrier
of proprietary technology and product diﬀerentiation – remember that
a few years later Giant was able to build distribution by oﬀering bike
shops exact replicas of Schwinn bikes at a 15% discount. The barriers of
know-how and eﬃciencies of scale in turn undermined the barriers of
product diﬀerentiation and access to distribution channels and capital
requirements. Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 85) predicted the possibility
of a transition from supplier to competitor, since once ‘Asian competi-
tors have built up advances in component markets first, they have then
leveraged oﬀ their superior products tomove downstream to build brand
share. And they are not likely to remain the low-cost suppliers forever. As
their reputation for brand leadership is consolidated, they may well gain
price leadership’.
The numbers support this speculation. In 1984, Taiwan was exporting
6,328,000 bikes with a total value of $ 281,596,000 and an average cost of
$ 44.5. Themajority of these were low-cost bikes for large retail outfits. By
1990, Taiwan was exporting 8,942,000 bikes with a total cost of $ 909,937,
920 and an average cost of $ 101.76. This was the period in which Tai-
wanese firms (led by Giant) began to produce high-end bikes for us
bike companies. In 1996, 9,692,000 bikes were sold for $ 984,185,670 at
an average price of $ 101.55. It is interesting to notice that no significant
change in the average value of bikes exported occurred between 1990 and
1996. What happened was rather that Taiwanese companies acting as out-
sourcers decided to sell their own brand. From when Giant launched its
own brand in 1985 to today, it has gone from producing all subcontracted
bikes for others to doing this with only a third of their production – with
the other two-thirds produced for their own label.
Despite a bad performance of us bike companies in the last decade,
the bike industry as a whole did relatively well in the 1990s. In 2000,
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the industry as a whole (including retail value of bicycles, related parts,
and accessories) was worth about $ 5.0 billion. In 1995, it was worth $ 5.2
billion, in 1994, $ 5.0 billion, in 1993, $ 4.3 billion, in 1992, $ 4.5 billion,
in 1991, $ 4.0 billion and in 1990, $ 3.6 billion. These numbers suggest
that the industry is mildly healthy with a general trend of growth. But
despite these seemingly placid numbers, the bicycle industry was under-
going dramatic changes.
We argue that themajor barrier to entry in the bicycle industry was the
interconnection between cutting edge technology, economies of scale,
and large distribution networks (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Herriott,
Levinthal, andMarch 1985; Levinthal 1997). In many cases, under normal
circumstances, it would be prohibitively expensive to do all three from a
standing start. In order to sell the bikes at a competitive rate, a company
would have to produce a large number of them. Yet it would take years for
a company to crack a complex decentralized distribution market like the
market for bike retailers in the us. Thus, an entering bike company has
to rely on producing extremely high quality hand-made bikes and slowly
increase distribution as it moves down market; otherwise it risks losing
money for years if it attempts mainstream distribution. Not all markets
have this dilemma. Inexpensive bikes, for example, are sold largely by
large retail chains such as K-Mart and Wal-Mart that could be negoti-
ated with for large quantities of bikes. Taiwanese and other Asian firms
were therefore able to crack that market in the 1970s without too much
diﬃculty. These markets truly did compete for the lowest price in a rela-
tively static technological environment.
But the specific nature of the outsourcing that Schwinn and others
did with Giant allowed Giant to crack the middle- and high-quality us
bike market despite barriers to entry. Economies of scale were not an
issue for Giant or a few other outsourcers in Taiwan (Makadok 1999;
Raﬀ 1991; Wernerfelt and Karnani 1987). Giant was already producing
millions of bikes for export to us companies; it was therefore able to
divert excess capacity after Schwinn scaled backmanufacturing in 1985 by
introducing its own line first in Europe, and, in 1987, in the us. It was able
to produce, with maximum cost eﬃciency, even when it was selling only
a few bikes under its own brand because its factories were running at near
full capacity for others. Today, after over a decade of double-digit growth,
two-thirds of Giant bikes are produced under its own brand. Schwinn
began a trend which led to the erosion of barriers to entry in the industry
as a whole. This eﬀect was not achieved by a destruction of any specific
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barrier listed by Porter (1975); instead it consisted of undermining the
relationship between barriers. The barriers seemed to be interrelated in
this market in such a way that giving up production in the way Schwinn
did may have led to the erosion of all other barriers.
Giant’s Decision toManufacture in China –
What are the Alternatives to Outsourcing?
Nevertheless, Schwinn’s decision to manufacture in Asia seems to have
been in some way inevitable sooner or later. Once any major bike maker
had outsourced, taking advantage of cheaper wages abroad, then, in or-
der to keep up with their competitors in a cost/quality calculation, all
major middle- and upper-end bike makers were also pressured to manu-
facture in a low-cost nation in order to continue to compete on cost (with
the exception of a few specialty bike producers within niche markets).
While collusion (which is illegal) might have avoided this problem if
enough major players agreed not to move manufacturing abroad, other,
legal options, could have been taken when faced with such a dilemma.
Economists often argue that manufacturing in Asia ensured a better al-
location of resources. Cheaper labor comprised a comparative advan-
tage in Asia, allowing us workers to focus on their own comparative ad-
vantages. These arguments, however, can be strengthened by including a
more thoughtful arrangement of outsourcing contracts, incentive struc-
tures and relationship management.
What else could Schwinn or others, looking to outsource in the
middle- and high- quality bike market, have done? The most obvious
place to look for such a strategy is in the Giant’s recent move to produce
in China, the new low-cost center for global production, where wages
are 1.16 $/hour (5.41 $/hour in Taiwan). This is a 1 : 0.21 Taiwan/China
wage ratio, higher than the 2.44 : 1 us/Taiwan ratio (13.42 $/hour vs.
5.41 $/hour). Bike production in China is growing; China is currently
producing 21% of all bikes sold in the World. Giant’s founder King Liu
has committed himself to producing and selling bikes in China. In 1996,
Giant made 550,000 bikes in China; in 2001, it was expecting to make 3.2
million bikes there, two-thirds of them for export. But rather than hiring
Chinese firms to produce their bikes, Giant and other Taiwanese bike
firms opened fully-owned subsidiaries in China. In a recent board meet-
ing, Liu, standing in front of pictures of racing bikes, said the following
about the recent competition in production and distribution in China:
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‘A lot of the competition there has actually been companies backed by
Taiwan. It’s just that they’re over in China now’. Continued production
in Taiwan and in Denmark has maintained Giant’s closeness to other
core markets and designed an advantage.
Giant produces each and every one of its top bikes in Taiwan, not
China, by the same group of highly skilled engineers. Its design teams
in the us, Europe, and Asia are constantly working on improving design,
trying out new designs in Giant factories, and responding to demands
of regional managers by creating whatever these managers believe will
be popular for sale in that region. While manufacturing in China makes
sense, especially with Giant in complete control of the factories, Giant
has no plans to close down its factories in the Netherlands or Taiwan.
Giant has in fact recently invested in a new 11,520 sq. meter facility in Eu-
rope. These factories, which are close to their markets, are seen as valu-
able resources for innovation and learning. Making bikes in Europe may
not be cheap, but it is the only way to truly understand and respond to
European demands and to pick up tricks that are then brought back to
Taiwan in the bi-annual meeting of designers and engineers from around
the world. Innovations are then spread throughout the company.
By expanding into China, Giant is less likely than Schwinn to erode
its core capabilities. In fact, since China was the source of over half of
Giant’s profits in 2000, it seems likely that Giant will use its manufactur-
ing capacity in China to link itself tightly with the needs and dynamics
of that market. With 3% of the bike market in China, Giant and its local
partner, Phoenix, plan on expanding. Chinese factories will increasingly
become more than just centers for producing bikes to be exported; they
will increasingly become linked sales in China and will use production to
fuel innovation for Chinese factories. The close link between production
and innovation will be crucial. As information and demands from Chi-
nese distributors are instantly transformed into products that can hit the
market, Giant is likely to turn its Chinese factories into more and more
valuable centers for capabilities and innovation.
What, in hindsight, could the us have learned from this model? A
blanket government regulation or bans on imports against outsourcing
would not have led to optimal results either for consumers, who would
pay a needlessly high price, or for companies, who would not be spurred
to be competitive in the global marketplace (Banerjee 2001; Jensen and
Ruback 1983; Wheelock andWilson 1995). Instead, as a start, bicycle mak-
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ers could have reflected more carefully on the core capabilities of the
bike industry and acted to help maintain them (Porter 1996; Porter and
Siggelkow 2000).
However, options are easy to spot in hindsight and much harder at the
time when information is more ambiguous, outcomes are less clear and
trends harder to spot. Even so, such analysis might be helpful in generat-
ing options to consider and could act as a warning in future decisions. In
this case, even if some part of production had been outsourced (a result
that appeared all but inevitable in the market conditions at the time) at
least some proportion of high-end production centers for key competi-
tive parts (frames and perhaps derailers) might have been produced by
the company, probably in the us closest to the core market. Further, an
attempt to open a company or joint venture subsidiaries in Asia might
have been advantageous in this case. Despite slightly higher costs, per-
haps the production of its best models should have been, for strategic
reasons, done exclusively in-house, protecting this core capability jeal-
ously. Further, small but high-tech factories could have been placed in
core markets (Europe, the us) in order to keep a tight link between
production and distribution. Lastly, any outsourcing should have been
spread among small Taiwanese firms rather than lumped into one or
two, if possible fragmented so that neither company possessed a full bun-
dle of core capabilities. This way, original companies could have main-
tained some control over their potential foreign rivals. If possible, con-
tractual agreements limiting suppliers’ ability to compete directly could
have been demanded.
The most essential part of the capabilities of production, once re-
flected upon, might have been maintained in-house (Wernerfelt 1984;
Wernerfelt 1995; Wernerfelt and Karnani 1987). Their ongoing techni-
cal knowledge would have allowed us bicycle manufacturers to main-
tain a high level of absorptive capacity to suggestions and needs realized
through their distribution networks. This strategy might have allowed
them both to keep their finger on the latest trends and to maintain a
steady stream of eclectic improvements.
Conclusion: The Potential Interconnectivity of Capabilities
and Interconnectivity of Barriers of Entry
In certain circumstances, both capabilities and barriers to entry are inter-
connected in such a way that sacrificing one of them or some necessary
but insuﬃcient component of them can lead to the subsequent vulner-
Managing Global Transitions
Innovation and the Interrelatedness of Core Competencies 59
ability or erosion of many others (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Levinthal
1997; 1998). In this model, some company’s capabilities are like the foun-
dational pillars of a house. Some pillars can be knocked down without
any other consequences. But there are other pillars, which are crucial to
the structural support of the house. Thus, a company’s core capabilities
are not all equal, nor are they additive – adding one and subtracting an-
other may not result in a wash. Similarly, certain capabilities allow access
to others, while others do not.
We have argued that in the case of the bicycle industry, of Schwinn
Corporation and Giant Manufacturing in particular, both the barriers to
entry and the firm capabilities were interrelated in certain ways. We sug-
gest it is the interconnectivity of barriers to entry and core capabilities
that are the key to the puzzle. Perhaps, in this case, a loss of manufac-
turing capabilities led to a loss of the ‘organizational learning’ barrier to
entry which in turn ricocheted to knock down the core capability of tech-
nical absorptive capacity (Herriott et al. 1985). In the case of Schwinn,
one decision regarding one core capability had broad and unanticipated
eﬀects which went beyond the capacity they relinquished. It does seem
that interrelated, interlocking barriers to entry and capabilities tell this
story. In this case, we have argued that manufacturing and distribution
were tightly linked in such a way that without this tight link, successful
incremental innovation would have become extremely diﬃcult.
Stalk et al. (1992, 57) illustrate well how an advantage in one dimen-
sion can fan out and create other previously unrelated strengths. ‘Com-
panies that compete eﬀectively on time – speeding new products to mar-
ket, manufacturing just in time, or responding promptly to customer
complaints – tend to be good at other things as well: for instance the con-
sistency of their product quality, the acuity of their insight into evolving
customer needs . . . or [the ability to] generate new ideas and incorpo-
rate them in innovations’. In some cases, instead of being able to choose
to add a single capability, or to choose to discard one, companies may
instead be choosing between sets, groups of interlinked or patterned ca-
pabilities. Seemingly, unrelated capabilities and strengths become mutu-
ally reinforcing or interconnected. A small change may require a major
reorganization of other core capabilities which its ostensible status belies.
It is said that Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, was having a hard
time capturing a particularly well-fortified Roman city. The city had high
walls surrounding it and an inexhaustible supply of water from a river
flowing through it. After a long siege Hannibal finally dug a new riverbed
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for the river and diverted its flow. This left a wide gap under the walls
of the city, where the river used to flow, through which he marched his
army and captured the city. For this city, its barriers to entry were inter-
connected in such a way that removing one quite literally undercut the
other. Success and failure, in business as in siege, may depend on under-
standing how core capabilities are interconnected and how barriers to
entry are interdependent.
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